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CATCH TWENTY-WU? THE ORAL ARGUMENT IN 
FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AND THE 
OBFUSCATION OF CRITICAL MASS 
Sheldon Bernard Lyke 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 10, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States heard 
oral argument in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
1—the latest 
challenge to race-conscious affirmative action university admissions 
programs.
2
 Court watchers highlighted that during the hearing, the Justices 
spent considerable time attempting to understand the meaning of a “critical 
mass” of minority students enrolled in universities and registered for 
individual courses.
3
 Critical mass emerged from the Justices’ questions in 
oral argument in a sort of catch-22. On one hand, it faced critiques that it 
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Designate, Whittier Law School. I give thanks to Erez Aloni, Stewart Chang, Veronica Root, and the 
Zodiac Junior Faculty Workshop at Northwestern University School of Law for their helpful 
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1
  No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012). 
2
  I use the terms race-conscious and affirmative action synonymously when describing programs 
that seek to diversify or ameliorate current and past racial discrimination or both. I agree with the 
sentiments that Ted Shaw expressed when he wrote that  
[t]he attack on affirmative action is insidious. Our opponents are trying to turn 
affirmative action into a pejorative. I do not want to get hung up on what we call 
“affirmative action.” If we abandoned the phrase and started calling it “fairness,” I 
guarantee you that within a year “fairness” would be a pejorative term. They 
would be saying, “Fairness isn’t fair.” So let’s not get all hung up on what we call 
it. 
Theodore M. Shaw, Comments of Theodore M. Shaw, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 489, 491 (1999). I 
agree with Shaw that instead of focusing on what we label affirmative action, it is more important to 
attack the pejorative meanings that opponents have attached to it. This Essay works to disassociate 
similar pejorative meanings from the term critical mass. 
3
  See, e.g., Victor Goode, Affirmative Action’s Fate May Turn on Defining ‘Critical Mass’ of 
Diversity, COLORLINES (Oct. 11, 2012, 10:37 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/ 
2012/10/affirmative_actions_fate_may_turn_on_defining_critical_mass_of_diversity.html (link); Peter 
Schmidt, Supreme Court Hearing in Texas Admissions Case Exposes Gaps in Affirmative-Action Law, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 10, 2012, http://chronicle.com/article/Supreme-Court-Hearing-
Exposes/134976 (link).  
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however, to quantify critical mass would place the concept into the 
unconstitutional realm of impermissible quotas. 
This Essay argues that the nature of the questions that lead to the 
critical mass catch-22 is a wu—a concept in Zen philosophy that can be 
used to describe questions that are flawed because their underlying 
conditions and assumptions do not match reality.
4
 The Essay examines the 
U.S. Supreme Court oral argument in Fisher, and illustrates that—
regardless of conservative or liberal judicial philosophy—most of the 
Justices’ understanding of the definition of critical mass relies on a 
misreading of Justice O’Connor’s articulation of the concept in Grutter v. 
Bollinger.
5
 This misreading is rooted partially in an attempt to gain the 
support of the perceived swing vote of Justice Anthony Kennedy. The 
formation of this misunderstanding, or what I call a “Catch Twenty-Wu”—a 
paradoxical problem that an individual cannot avoid because of 
fundamentally flawed constraints that are not grounded in reality—is the 
latest engine fueling a thirty-five-year conservative campaign that began 
with Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
6
 and has slowly, 
incrementally gutted affirmative action structures in the United States. 
I. THE CRITICAL MASS CATCH-22 
In the realm of race-conscious remedies and equal protection doctrine, 
critical mass is a relatively new concept. Counting Grutter, the Fisher oral 
argument marks the second time the Court has contemplated the meaning of 
critical mass in the context of university admissions. A brief background on 
the origin of the concept and its contested nature in oral argument follows. 
A. Grutter: The Source of the Critical Mass Concept 
The concept of critical mass first appears in Grutter, in which the 
Supreme Court held that using race to pursue a critical mass of student body 
diversity to enrich the educational experience was a compelling government 
interest. The Court endorsed a number of reasons for the University of 
Michigan Law School to pursue critical mass. First, achieving critical mass 
avoids minority tokenism, and therefore disadvantaged minority students 
are not made to feel isolated or like racial spokespersons.
7
 Second, 
nonminority students can avoid racial stereotypes of the “minority 
viewpoint” as they learn that there are a variety of viewpoints among 
minority students.
8





  Wu is a Chinese word that is used as a means of negation. It translates into English as “no,” “not,” 
“nothing,” or “without.” HELEN J. BARONI, THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ZEN BUDDHISM 229 
(2002). For a more detailed discussion of the concept, see infra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
5
  539 U.S. 306 (2003) (link). 
6
  438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion) (link). 
7
  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319. 
8
  Id. at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Kennedy disfavored the use of the critical mass concept, characterizing it as 
an “attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to 
achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”9 
B. The Fisher Oral Argument 
Critical mass first appeared in the Fisher oral argument in response to 
Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion that the Texas affirmative action program 
was more modest and less aggressive than the University of Michigan Law 
School’s affirmative action program approved in Grutter.10 Bert Rein, the 
attorney for Abigail Fisher, responded: 
 
In order to satisfy Grutter, you first have to say that you are 
not just using race gratuitously, but it is in the interest of 
producing a critical mass of otherwise underrepresented 
students. And so to—to be within [the] Grutter framework, 
the first question is, absent the use of race, would we be 




Rein argued that determining whether a university’s student body lacks 
a critical mass of diversity is a necessary prerequisite to determine whether 
a state institution can use race as a factor in its admissions. In an exchange 
with Justice Breyer, Rein pointed out that the University of Texas never 
satisfied this prerequisite, and that it was indeed impossible for the 
university to answer this question because it never defined critical mass in 
quantifiably testable terms. He stated: 
 
[T]here was no effort in this case to establish a—even a 
working target for critical mass. They simply ignored it. 
They just used words, and they said, we’ve got to do more. 
So they never answered the predicate question, which 





Conservative Justices echoed Rein’s critique of the vagueness of 
critical mass. Their questions revealed a frustration that employed an 
amorphous articulation of critical mass, and that a failure to quantify critical 





  Id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
10
  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. 
argued Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/11-345.pdf [hereinafter Fisher Oral Argument] (link). 
11
  Id. (italics added). 
12
  Id. at 13 (italics added). 
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to assess whether the use of race was narrowly tailored to the compelling 
government interest of achieving educational diversity. 
A question from Justice Alito encapsulated the vagueness discussion. 
He asked, “Mr. Rein, do you understand what the University of Texas 
thinks is the definition of a critical mass? Because I don’t.”13 Justice Alito’s 
question and subsequent remark supported Rein’s claim that the University 
of Texas’s articulation of critical mass was unclear. A finding that critical 
mass is vague could lead to the legal conclusion that the University of 
Texas’s affirmative action plan is not narrowly tailored. Similarly, Chief 
Justice Roberts posed this scenario to Gregory Garre, the attorney for the 
University of Texas, in the following exchange: 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What is that number? What 
is the critical mass of African Americans and Hispanics at 
the university that you are working toward? 
MR. GARRE: Your Honor, we don’t have one. And—and 
this Court in Grutter— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So how are we supposed to 
tell whether this plan is narrowly tailored to that goal? 
MR. GARRE: To look to the same criteria of this Court in 
Grutter. This Court in Grutter specifically rejected the 




Chief Justice Roberts resumed this line of question in a later exchange with 
Garre: 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I understand my job, under 
our precedents, to determine if your use of race is narrowly 
tailored to a compelling interest. The compelling interest 
you identify is attaining a critical mass of minority students 
at the University of Texas, but you won’t tell me what the 
critical mass is. How am I supposed to do the job that our 
precedents say I should do? 
MR. GARRE: Your Honor, what—what this Court’s 
precedents say is a critical mass is an environment in which 
students of underrepresented— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I know what you say, but 
when will we know that you’ve reached a critical mass? 





  Id. at 20. 
14
  Id. at 39–40 (italics added). 
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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Grutter said there has to be a 
logical end point to your use of race. What is the logical 





Garre responded to Chief Justice Roberts with a qualitative standard, 
that critical mass is achieved when a minority student no longer feels racial 
isolation or feels like a spokesperson for her race.
16
 When the Chief Justice 
asked for additional factors used to determine critical mass, Garre 
introduced a numerical consideration, yet refused to take it to its 
quantitative conclusion: 
 
MR. GARRE: Another is that we did look to enrollment 
data, which showed, for example, among African 
Americans, that African American enrollment at the 
University of Texas dropped to 3 percent in 2002 under the 
percentage plan. 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: At what level will it satisfy 
the critical mass? 
MR. GARRE: Well, I think we all agree that 3 percent is 
not a critical mass. It’s . . . well beyond that.17 
 
Garre’s response seemed to imply that numbers can tell us when we do 
not have critical mass, yet he was unwilling to use quantitative measures to 
describe when a university does reach critical mass. Like Justice Potter 
Stewart’s threshold test for obscenity, the university appeared only to 
employ a minimum numerical standard for minority enrollment and critical 




While Garre stated that three percent was not enough, the Chief Justice 
continued to press the question of what percentage constituted a critical 
mass: 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes, but at what level will it 





  Id. at 46–47 (italics added). 
16
  See id. at 47. 
17
  Id. at 48. 
18
  See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today 
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand 
description [of pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it 
when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”) (link). 
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MR. GARRE: When we have an environment in which 
African Americans do not— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: When—how am I supposed 
to decide whether you have an environment within 
particular minorities who don’t feel isolated? 
MR. GARRE: Your Honor, part of this is a—is a judgment 
that the admin—the educators are going to make, but you 
would look to the same criteria— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So, I say—when you tell me, 
that’s good enough.19 
 
The oral argument made it clear that vagueness was not the only 
problem plaguing critical mass. One solution to the vagueness problem was 
to provide a quantifiable measure of critical mass. Justice Sotomayor, 
however, categorized any quantification of critical mass as a quota. In one 
exchange, Justice Sotomayor pressed Fisher’s attorney to articulate the 
standard for determining critical mass, and to state how the University of 
Texas’s use of race did not fit the narrow tailoring required by strict 
scrutiny as articulated in Grutter: 
 
MR. REIN: First of all, if you think about narrow tailoring, 
you can’t tailor to the unknown. If you have no range of 
evaluation, if you have no understanding of what critical 
mass means, you can’t tailor to it. 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So you have to set a quota for 
critical mass? 
MR. REIN: No. There’s—there’s a huge difference, and 
it’s an important one that is not well put out by the 
University of Texas. Having a range, a view as to what 
would be an appropriate level of comfort, critical mass, as 
defined in Grutter, allows you to evaluate where you are— 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So we won’t call it a quota, 
we’ll call it a goal, something Grutter said you shouldn’t 
have. 
MR. REIN: Well, Justice Sotomayor, I think it’s very 
important to distinguish between the operative use of that 
range. In other words, that’s where we are, and we’re going 
to use race until we get there, every year, in consideration 





  Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 48. 
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JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Boy, it sounds awfully like a 
quota to me, that Grutter said you should not be doing, that 
you shouldn’t be setting goals, that you shouldn’t be setting 
quotas. You should be setting an individualized assessment 
of the applicants.  
Tell me how this system doesn’t do that.20 
 
Justice Sotomayor appears to contend that the Fisher attorney’s solution to 
the problem of vagueness—to quantify critical mass—is akin to a quota, 
and that quotas—or even mere numerical goals—are tools that Grutter 
forbids. 
Competing claims that critical mass was too vague or an impermissible 
quota placed the concept in a dangerous catch-22. Regardless of how one 
defined critical mass, the definition could lead to a finding of 
unconstitutionality. Following oral argument, Cornell Law Professor 
Michael Dorf characterized the Court’s dilemma as a “critical mass catch-
22” where “[f]ailure to quantify critical mass would leave the university 
open to the charge that it did not discharge its burden of proof. But if the 
university did quantify critical mass, then it would instead be accused of 
using a quota—which the Court’s affirmative action cases also forbid.”21 
II. CATCH TWENTY-WU? 
The catch-22 in the Fisher oral argument is a result of poor readings of 
the Court’s affirmative action precedents and attempts to appease Justice 
Kennedy. The questioning and assumptions about critical mass discussed 
during the oral argument were not grounded in the Bakke and Grutter 
opinions’ articulation of the narrow tailoring requirement. A close reading 
of those precedents reveals that there is no catch-22. Rather, when 
presented with contradictory questions of whether the qualitative nature of 
critical mass leads to a failure in narrow tailoring or whether the 
quantification of critical mass triggers an illegal quota, proponents for 
affirmative action must realize that these questions are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and that both questions can be best answered with the 
Zen Buddhist response: wu. 
The Chinese word wu can be interpreted as the declaration that a 
question is problematic in its foundations and that, based on the terms 
provided, no answer can exist. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Gödel, 
Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, Douglas Hofstadter used the wu 





  Id. at 19–20 (italics added). 
21
  Michael C. Dorf, The Recent Supreme Court Affirmative Action Oral Argument Zeroes in on the 
Concept of “Critical Mass,” JUSTIA.COM VERDICT (Oct. 17, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/ 
2012/10/17/the-recent-supreme-court-affirmative-action-oral-argument-zeroes-in-on-the-concept-of-
critical-mass (link).  
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underlying conditions do not match reality, or to indicate that a question is 
fundamentally flawed.
22
 Hofstadter drew his understanding of this concept 
from the Mu Kôan, a parable from Zen practice in which a student asks his 
master whether a dog has a Buddha nature. The Zen master replies, “Mu”—
the Japanese translation of wu.
23
 The Zen master’s reply indicates that the 
premise of the student’s question—that a Buddha nature is found in some 
things but not in others—is flawed. The question ignores that a Buddha 




“Un-asking” the critical mass questions at oral argument puts the 
Justices’ questions in perspective, rejects their false premises, and permits a 
more accurate restatement of the meaning of critical mass and quotas as 
they were initially articulated in precedent. Acknowledging the flaws in 
questioning is a better way to address Justice Kennedy’s swing-vote 
concerns. 
A. What Is Critical Mass? 
The Fisher case does not present a real catch-22, because a close 
reading of the Court’s precedents—contrary to both conservative and liberal 
Justices’ remarks in oral argument—demonstrates that critical mass has 
both quantitative and qualitative elements. When analyzed properly, these 
elements are narrowly tailored for the purpose of strict scrutiny and do not 
lead to the practice or production of illegal quotas. Based on a combined 
reading of Bakke and Grutter, critical mass is a complicated concept, but it 
is not amorphous, vague, or undefinable. 
The general concept of critical mass does have origins in numerical 
representation. In addition to the affirmative action context, critical mass 
has been used in fields as divergent as business and nuclear physics to 
describe the minimum amount of something needed in order for a specific 
result to occur or to be sustained.
25
 Critical mass is grounded, at least in 
part, in a numerical understanding. 
But contrary to Justice Sotomayor’s claim that goals and quotas are 
synonymous,
26
 the Grutter Court never ruled that (1) universities cannot 
have goals, or (2) numbers cannot be used with respect to setting goals in a 
constitutional race-conscious admissions plan. In fact, there is evidence that 





  See DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GÖDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 231–45 
(1979). 
23
  THE GATELESS BARRIER: THE WU-MEN KUAN (MUMONKAN) 7 (Robert Aitken trans., N. Point 
Press 1991). 
24
  See id. at 10. 
25
  See Critical Mass Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
american_english/critical+mass (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (link). 
26
  See Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 19–20. 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/19/ 217 
lengths to demonstrate that there is a distinction between goals and quotas. 
According to Grutter, quotas reserve opportunities for certain minority 
groups, and the institution of quotas requires that a rigid percentage or 
number be attained, or not exceeded.
27
 The Court stated that goals are 
distinguishable and permissible because they require only that there is a 
good faith effort to come within range of the goal.
28
 Unlike quotas, goals 
allow each candidate to compete with all other applicants.
29
 
Second, both Bakke and Grutter approved the role of numbers when 
setting admissions goals. Relying on Bakke, Grutter states that, alone, some 
attention to numbers “does not transform a flexible admissions system into 
a rigid quota.”30 Both the Bakke plurality opinion and the Grutter majority 
endorsed the Harvard College Admissions Plan, which “certainly had 
minimum goals for minority enrollment, even if it had no specific number 
firmly in mind.”31 There were numbers that Harvard admissions officers 
believed too low to achieve diversity. The Harvard Plan argued that “10 or 
20 black students could not begin to bring to their classmates and to each 
other the variety of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks 
in the United States.”32 
While Justice Sotomayor was correct to be careful in announcing 
numbers with respect to critical mass, she went too far to state that goals 
linked to numbers looked just like impermissible quotas. Goals and 
numbers are acceptable under both Bakke and Grutter. One must pay 
special attention, however, to the specific contexts in which the Court 
approved the use of numbers. In Bakke, Justice Powell referred to the 
Harvard Plan in the appendix to his opinion. The Harvard Plan noted that 
numbers have a role in diversity admissions programs because “there is 
some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be 
derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a 
reasonable environment for those students admitted.”33 The Harvard Plan 
made it clear, however, that attention to numbers did not mean that the 
university had set a mandatory minimum quota for admissions. The 






  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003) (citing Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l 
Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
28
  The Court wrote, “In contrast, ‘a permissible goal . . . require[s] only a good-faith effort . . . to 
come within a range demarcated by the goal itself . . . .’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sheet Metal 
Workers, 478 U.S. at 495 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
29
  Id. (citing Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987)). 
30
  Id. at 336 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978) (appendix to 
plurality opinion)). 
31
  Id. at 335. 
32
  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323 (appendix to plurality opinion). 
33
  Id. 
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But that awareness does not mean that the Committee sets a 
minimum number of blacks or of people from west of the 
Mississippi who are to be admitted. It means only that in 
choosing among thousands of applicants who are not only 
“admissible” academically but have other strong qualities, 
the Committee, with a number of criteria in mind, pays 





The wu answer allows for a more accurate assessment of the Court’s 
holdings and a very different response to the conservative Justices’ 
questions. Contrary to the Justices’ claims that critical mass can be reduced 
to a numerical representation, neither Grutter nor Bakke ever ruled that 
critical mass was solely a fixed number or range. How should one answer 
the conservative Justices’ questions about the numerical threshold for 
critical mass? The answer is that while one component of critical mass is a 
university’s numerical goal, it also requires a relative assessment of the 
number of qualified students who apply for admission. The Harvard Plan, 
which Justice Powell approved, tells us so. 
Under our current constitutional framework, universities cannot have 
predetermined, fixed, or inflexible admissions results or requirements. 
Universities can have a numerical goal that is not a requirement, however. 
These numerical goals can be used to guide which individuals are chosen 
from a qualified pool of applicants. Critical mass is achieved when a 
university chooses the most diverse class based on its pool of available, 
qualified applicants. If a student is not qualified, then he can never be 
considered for meeting a university’s diversity goal. If there are too few 
racial minorities who meet a university’s qualifications, then a university’s 
goal would go unmet. 
Based on the number of students who apply and their qualifications, a 
university (or, in the instance of constitutional scrutiny, a court) cannot 
necessarily determine some fixed number that constitutes critical mass—but 
can determine the critical mass the university can generate from the 
qualified pool of applicants. A university may have a numerical goal of 
racial-minority students, but because there is no requirement, and due to the 
changing demographics and qualifications of applicants from year to year, 
the actual number of students offered admission will fluctuate. The 
fluctuation does not reveal that critical mass is vague. To the contrary, it is 
a testament to its relative and complicated nature.
35





  Id. at 323–24. 
35
  This scenario is analogous to the facts of Grutter, where the Court observed (and Justice Kennedy 
conceded) that between 1993 and 1998 the minority student enrollment at the University of Michigan 
Law School fluctuated between 13.5% and 20.1%. The Court argued that this variance was inconsistent 
with a quota. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336. 
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reading of Bakke and Grutter, it might be helpful (and more accurate) to 
formulate a clearer statement of the state’s interest—that the government’s 
compelling interest is in a student body that has a critical mass of diversity 
given its qualified applicants. This reading more closely matches a 
justification that links diversity to the pursuit of educational excellence. It is 
contrary to conservative readings that once some quantified critical mass is 
reached, schools no longer have a need to consider race
36—a view and a 
standard that has no support in either Bakke or Grutter.
37
  
One benefit to this articulation of critical mass is that it acknowledges 
a fact that often goes unstated in discussions of affirmative action and 
university admissions—that there is a difference between whether a student 
is admissible and qualified, and whether a student will be offered 
admission. It assumes that there are a number of considerations in addition 
to a student’s merit that go into an admissions offer. One factor must be 
how well a student will fit within, and enrich, a university’s student body. 
Contributing to a school’s student-body diversity is one measure of 
enrichment. The weight and importance of these considerations remain 
frequently unconsidered and undiscussed in debates on affirmative action. 
Another benefit to conceptualizing critical mass as relative, and guided 
by numbers, is that it directly addresses the Justices’ questions intimating 
vagueness. Judges would be able to review a university’s goals in 
conjunction with the policies and methods that an admissions committee 
uses to decide between qualified candidates when building a student body. 
This is in contrast to the University of Texas’s response, which flatly 
asserted that it was barred from using numerical considerations and could 
only define critical mass with respect to qualitative descriptions of student 
isolation and the avoidance of minority tokenism. Additionally, by 
recognizing the role of quantitative considerations in the definition of 
critical mass, the relative approach to critical mass avoids a potentially fatal 
flaw in the University of Texas’s argument. In one breath the university 
claimed that critical mass is not numerical, yet argued that we can “all agree 
that 3 percent is not a critical mass. It’s . . . well beyond that.”38—a 





  Susannah W. Pollvogt argues that concerns that a school might achieve too much diversity 
assumes that reaching a numerical critical mass of minorities means that universities no longer have a 
need to construct diverse student bodies. She argues that such concerns do not fit well with the 
educational excellence justification supported in Bakke and Grutter. See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Casting 
Shadows: Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and the Misplaced Fear of “Too Much” Diversity, 72 
MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 1, 11 (2013) (link). 
37
  While Grutter states that there must be a logical end point to the use of race, the decision never 
articulated a standard that this end point is somehow tied to, or should be measured to, the attainment of 
some fixed quantified critical mass. This is a fundamental misreading of Grutter. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 342 (“We see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement that all 
governmental use of race must have a logical end point.”). 
38
  Fisher Oral Argument, supra note 10, at 48. 
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B. Why the Catch Twenty-Wu? 
A misreading of Court precedent partially explains the catch twenty-
wu. A more complete explanation, however, includes how advocates have 
tried to appease Justice Kennedy. Advocates have operated from an 
understanding that linking critical mass to numbers will likely draw Justice 
Kennedy’s disapproval. In an exchange explaining the definition of critical 
mass to Chief Justice Roberts, Solicitor General Verrilli betrayed this 
concern. Verrilli said:  
 
I don’t think there is a number, and I don’t think it would 
be prudent for this Court to suggest that there is a number, 
because it would raise exactly the kind of problem that I—
that I think Justice Kennedy identified in the Grutter 





Verrilli’s statement indicates his belief that Kennedy opposes the use of any 
numerical considerations in affirmative action. 
In his dissent in Grutter, Justice Kennedy wrote: 
 
The consultation of daily reports during the last stages 
in the admissions process suggests there was no further 
attempt at individual review save for race itself. The 
admissions officers could use the reports to recalibrate the 
plus factor given to race depending on how close they were 
to achieving the Law School’s goal of critical mass. The 
bonus factor of race would then become divorced from 
individual review; it would be premised instead on the 




Justice Kennedy’s dissent does not necessarily voice apprehension for 
numerical goals. Instead, it expresses a concern over how universities 
utilize numbers and whether a university changes its admission criteria in 
order to meet predetermined numbers, thereby producing a link between 
goals and results indicative of quotas. There is no apprehension for numbers 
per se, but an exchange between Justice Kennedy and the attorney 
representing the University of Texas still reveals a concern about the nexus 
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JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose we—that you, in your 
experience identify a numerical category a numerical 
standard, a numerical designation for critical mass: It’s X 
percent. During the course of the admissions process, can 
the admissions officers check to see how close they are 
coming to this numerical— 
MR. GARRE: No. No, Your Honor, and we don’t. On page 
389 of the joint— 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: You—you cannot do that? 
MR. GARRE: We—we wouldn’t be monitoring the class. I 
think one of the problems— 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: But isn’t that what happened in 
Grutter; it allowed that. 
MR. GARRE: It did, Your Honor. It was one of the 
things— 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: So are you saying that Grutter is 
incorrect? 
MR. GARRE: No, Your Honor. It was one of the things 
that you pointed out in your dissent. What I’m saying is we 
don’t have that problem, because— 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: I’m—I’m asking whether or not 
you could do that. And if— 
MR. GARRE: I don’t think so, because the Grutter 
majority didn’t understand it to be monitoring for the 




Justice Kennedy is perceived as a swing-vote Justice, arguably 
occupying a middle ground between conservative and liberal judicial 
positions on the proper use of racial categories in the context of education.
42
 
One could argue that proponents of affirmative action have unnecessarily 
abandoned discussions of numerical considerations in an attempt to appease 
Justice Kennedy. This approach is unfortunate because, not only does it fail 
to address Justice Kennedy’s fundamental concern over quotas—a 
mechanistic link between goals and actual admissions—but it abandons the 
use of strong persuasive precedent that would support affirmative action 
programs undergoing strict scrutiny analysis. 
In his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy focused on what he determined 
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admissions process. Affirmative action proponents would be wise to remind 
Justice Kennedy that Justice Powell specifically addressed and approved 
considerations of race (as well as other factors) in the final stages of 
admissions as articulated in the Harvard Plan. The Harvard Plan stated: 
 
The further refinements sometimes required help to 
illustrate the kind of significance attached to race. The 
Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, 
might find itself forced to choose between A, the child of a 
successful black physician in an academic community with 
promise of superior academic performance, and B, a black 
who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents 
whose academic achievement was lower but who had 
demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an 
apparently-abiding interest in black power. If a good 
number of black students much like A but few like B had 
already been admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and 
vice versa. If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic 
talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his 
unique quality might give him an edge over both A and B. 
Thus, the critical criteria are often individual qualities or 





The Bakke-, Grutter-, and Justice Kennedy-endorsed Harvard Plan 
states that the use of race in deciding between two or three candidates in the 
final stages of admissions is relative and can depend on the distribution of 
those candidates’ individual characteristics among the already admitted 
student body. This is akin to the “consultation of daily reports” that 
concerned Justice Kennedy in Grutter,
44
 but it is not a policy in which a 
school changes its admissions decisions to reach some predetermined 
number. The Harvard Plan’s articulation of the use of race in the last stages 
of admissions is important because it neutralizes Justice Kennedy’s critique 
of the Grutter majority, demonstrating that Grutter was not a departure 
from Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. 
In fact, Justice Kennedy has argued that Justice Powell’s opinion was 
controlling both with respect to the compelling government interest and 
with respect to the issue here, whether the admissions process was narrowly 
tailored.
45
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controlling, then it is important to highlight Justice Powell’s support and 
reliance on the Harvard Plan, which allowed for a review of race and the 
distribution of admitted students during the final stages of admissions. 
A strong answer to Justice Kennedy’s question to the University of 
Texas as to whether an admissions office can consult daily reports with 
respect to predetermined numerical goals would be to say that numbers can 
be used just as in the Harvard Plan. There can be no fixed number of racial 
admits that must be attained. Instead, numbers are used to determine the 
admissions distribution of applicants who have already been deemed 
qualified and admissible. Race is never the sole controlling factor for a 
student’s admission because there are other factors, in addition to race, that 
are considered and taken into account when building a student body that has 
a critical mass of diversity with respect to the qualified applicants. 
CONCLUSION 
A misreading of Supreme Court precedent, coupled with attempts to 
appease Justice Kennedy, have left the concept of critical mass in a position 
that, at first glance, seems indefensible. The Fisher oral argument 
demonstrated that by refusing to articulate numbers, the University of Texas 
fueled a catch-22 and drew the conservative criticism that the university 
was administering an unquantifiable definition of critical mass that was 
overly vague and judicially not evaluable. In addition, when affirmative 
action proponents ignored numbers, they failed to trigger the supportive 
language and arguments that Justice Powell laid out in Bakke—a judgment 
Justice Kennedy supports fully. 
“Un-asking” the questions that lead to the critical mass catch-22 can 
lead to awareness that our present understandings of precedent are 
misguided. Answering these questions with wu can teach the affirmative 
action advocate the need to acknowledge and be cautious of her role in a 
conservative movement that challenges the use of race to achieve equality. 
This thirty-five-year conservative movement began in Bakke and has used a 
language of colorblindness to shift justifications for affirmative action away 
from equality and racial remediation to arguments in favor of diversity. 
Prior to Bakke, quotas were legal, yet today the mere mention of numbers in 
the same breath as critical mass conjures the specter of unconstitutionality.  
The catch twenty-wu is only possible because opponents of affirmative 
action have reframed and reconceptualized critical mass outside of its 
established framework as a relative, not a rigid, criterion. Equality is 
likewise relative, and not rigid or colorblind. Halting the shift away from 
equality requires staking progressive claims, and refusing to discard strong, 
well-accepted arguments, which are grounded in history in a misguided 
attempt to curry favor with middle-leaning Justices. “Un-asking” flawed 
questions in order to move beyond conservative discursive frames is a 
powerful step toward achieving this goal. 
